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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
OWEN RAY KNUTESON 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant 
JACQUELINE A. KNUTESON Case No. 16615 
Defendant and 
Respondent 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is plaintiff's appeal from the court's finding that 
defendant was not residing with a person of the opposite sex, as 
provided for under Section 30-3-5(3), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended,, and from the order of the court denying plaintiff's motion 
to terminate alimony. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Piaintiff filed his affidavit in support of an Order to 
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Show Cause, upon which the court entered its order requiring 
defendant to show cause why the alimony award~d to defendant under 
a Decree of Divorce should not be terminated because defendant was 
residing with a person of the opposite sex. The hearing was held by 
the court on December 19, 1979, whereupon the court found that 
defendant had not been living with a person of the opposite sex, as 
referred to in Section 30-3-5(3), Utah Code Annotated 1953,, as 
amended, and extended its order denying plaintiff's claim that 
alimony should be terminated. From this Order and Judgment plaintiff 
appeals. 
, RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks to have the order of the lower court 
reversed, and for an order terminating alimony. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A contested divorce was heard by the trial court on the 
13th of August 19 79, with the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Decree of Divorce being entered.by the court on September 10, 
1979 (R pg After the trial of the divorce matter, but before the 
2 
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decree was signed and entered by the court, defendant, on about 
August 27, 1979 (Tr 26), moved from the home awarded to her, 
moving a part of her furniture (Tr 24), and most of her personal items, 
and moved into the house of a male friend, Gay Conder, where she 
resided until approximately November 7, 1979 (Tr 29). During this 
period of time, she occupied the bed and bedroom with Conder (Tr 30), 
and engaged in regular sexual intercourse (Tr 20), living, as it were, 
like husband and wife. Plaintiff learned of defendant's conduct and 
filed his motion for termination of alimony. Before defendant was 
served with the court-rs Order to Show Cause, she moved from Conder's 
home and returned to her own home, but continued to have sexual 
relations with Conder (Tr 21). The conduct and sexual relations 
between the defendant and Conder were admitted by both in their 
testimony before the court (Tr 20, 30). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLALl\ITIFF WAS ENTITLED TO AN ORDER 
TERMINATING ALIMONY REQUIB.ED TO BE PAID 
TO DEFENDANT BY REASON OF DEFENDANT'S 
3 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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CONDUCT, AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
SECTION 30-3-5(3), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
1953, AS AMENDED. 
This matter is primarily one of fact and definition of 
the law, and appears to be one of first impression before the court. 
Plainti~f maintains that the undisputed facts before the 
court show that even prior to the entry of the Decree of Divorce, and 
continuing after its entry, that defendant was residing with a person 
of the opposite sex, with an admitted conduct of regular sexual contact. 
In filing his motion for termination of alimony, plaintiff 
relied upon Section 30-3-5(3)., Utah Code Annotated 19 53, as 
amended, which provides: 
11 (3) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony 
to a former spouse shall be terminated upon applica-
tion of that party 'establishing that the former 
spouse is residing with a person of the opposite 
sex, unless it is further established by the person 
receiving alimony that the relationship or association 
between them is without any sexual contact. 1" 
(Emphasis mine). 
The wording of this section of the statute appears to be 
mandatory, since it says that the alimony order "shall be terminated" 
- 4 
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upon establishing that the former spouse is residing with a person 
of the opposite sex. Here, not only did plaintiff establish that 
defendant was residing with a person of the opposite sex, but he 
established that the defendant had moved in with furniture, personal 
property, and with her minor children, and lived as husband and wife, 
occupying the same bed and enjoying regular sexual "contact;" all of 
this while plaintiff was under an order of the court to support her by 
the payment of alimony. All of the provisions of Section 30-3-5(3) 
have been met and, clearly, the intent of the legislature, to prevent 
the injustice of alimony being paid to a former spouse who chooses to 
live with another partner, has been established. 
It is conceded that a single incident of sexual misconduct 
was not the concern of the legislature but, in the case before the 
court, defendant's conduct is no mere single incident. Here, she 
moved in, brought her fi.txniture, personal property and children, and 
children, and gave her new partner all of the benefits of marriage, 
without the legalititY of marriage. The fact that she was not living 
in Mr. Conder' s home at the time the matter was finally heard by the 
5 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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·court, should not alter the truth of the fact that, she had been, and was, 
living with him when the plaintiff requested the court's assistance. 
These are the facts that exist, notwithstanding the court's conclusion 
·that defendant was not residing with a member of the opposite sex, as 
defined by Section 30-3-5(3). 
Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary, 2nd Edition, 
defines the word ureside" as: 
"To dwell permanently or for a length of time; 
to have a settled abode for a time; to abide; 
to live in or at. " 
From this definition, and from the facts, it seems clear that the 
defendant, by living with Mr. Conder from August 27 to November 7, 
certainly did reside with him. 
The issue here is purely one of statutory construction. 
The courts of this state have no common-law jurisdiction over divorce 
or its incidents. The power to modify a provision for alimony is only 
such as is conferred by statute. 
Prior to the enactment of 30~3-5(3) in 1979, remarriage 
of the former wife was generally necessary before alimony could be 
6 
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terminated. In 1979, the legislature, recognizing the great change 
in personal relationships brought about by the era of "new morality", 
enacted Section 30-5-5(3), in order to allow the courts to consider 
the effect of newly formed relationships upon the requirement to pay 
alimony. The language is unequivocal in its position, and it is clear 
that the legislature intended the courts to recognize current socio-
realities in applying the statute. 
Unlike the provisions of the California laws which, 
prior to 1976, required proof that a former spouse was living with 
a person of the opposite sex, and holding himself or herself out as 
the spouse of the person for a total of 30 days, and which now only 
provides that there is a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden 
of proof of decreased need for support in the event of cohabitation 
with the opposite sex (California Civil Code, Sec. 4801. 5); Section 
30-3-5(3) requires only that the former spouse resides with a pers_on 
of the opposite sex. 
Therefore, the fact. that defendant elected to enter 
into a meretricious relationship should be sufficient to justify the 
7 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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termination of alimony. 
POINT II 
THE COURT SHOULD REQUIRE DEFENDANT 
TO REPAY ALL ALIMONY RECEIVED BY HER. 
Since defendant,, as established by her own testimony,, 
moved into the Conder ho.me and began to reside with him even before 
the Decree of Di.vorce was entered,, it seems only proper that all 
monies paid to her as alimony should be returned to the plaintiff. 
While this subject has not been addressed by this court, 
it was considered by the California court in the matter in In re 
Marriage of Ludwig,, 130 Cal Rptr 234. There, the court held: 
11Upon receipt of support money after January, 
1975, where a spouse is holding himself or herself 
out il'l: the manner operative under 4801. 5, the 
receiving spouse is no more than an involuntary 
trustee of the funds received. Upon proper 
motion to the court, and proof of the operative 
facts to the satisfaction of the court, its order 
properly shall issue requiring return of those 
funds.'' 
The trial court did not consider this question, having 
determined that defendant was not residing with a person of the 
opposite sex, as contemplated by Section 30-3-5(3). It is the 
8 
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prerogative of this court, acting in equity to consider this question 
and to enter its order requiring repayment of the alimony paid by 
plaintiff to defendant. King v. King,, 478 P2 492; 25 Ut2 163. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the facts before the court, plaintiff respectfully 
submits that the provisions of Section 30-3-5(3) are applicable,, and 
that the conduct of the defendant was exactly that contemplated by 
the legislature in enacting that provision. Thus, the trial court 
committed error in failing to grant plaintiff's motion for termination 
of alimony. This court should therefore reverse the trial court and 
enter an order terminating the provisions of the Decree of Divorce 
requiring plaintiff to pay to defendant alimony in the sum of $150 per 
month. Additionally, the court should enter its order requiring 
defendant to repay all sums paid to her as alimony. 
Respectfully submitted this 
WALTER R. ELLETT 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
